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Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business
Workouts and State Law
Edward R. Morrison
ABSTRACT
Federal bankruptcy law is rarely used by distressed small businesses. For every 100 that suspend
operations, at most 20 file for bankruptcy. The rest use state law procedures to liquidate or
reorganize. This paper documents the importance of these procedures and the conditions
under which they are chosen using firm-level data on Chicago-area small businesses. I show
that business owners bargain with senior lenders over the resolution of financial distress.
Federal bankruptcy law is invoked only when bargaining fails. This tends to occur when there
is more than one senior lender or when the debtor has defaulted on senior debt (harming
trust-based relationships with lenders). These findings raise questions about the design of
and need for federal bankruptcy law.
1. INTRODUCTION
Federal bankruptcy filings are rare relative to the number of small busi-
ness failures. About 540,000 small businesses closed their doors during
2003, but only 34,000 (6 percent) filed petitions under the U.S. Bank-
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ruptcy Code.1 Many businesses, to be sure, close for reasons unrelated
to financial distress and so are unlikely to be candidates for a bankruptcy
filing. But the story changes little when we focus on businesses in fi-
nancial distress. For every 100 such businesses that shut down, fewer
than 20 file for bankruptcy. The vast majority of small businesses resolve
distress under state law. They renegotiate with creditors (workouts) or
invoke formal procedures for liquidating or reorganizing a business, such
as assignments for the benefit of creditors (ABCs).
These alternatives to federal bankruptcy law have received limited
attention in the academic literature. Workouts have been studied by
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Gilson (1991, 1997), Schwartz (1994),
White (1994), and others in the context of large corporate insolvencies.
It is generally thought, however, that workouts are undermined by hold-
out and other coordination problems among the dispersed creditors of
a large corporation (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991; Roe 1983). Coor-
dination problems may be less important among small businesses. Adler
(1997, pp. 374–75), for example, assumes that these businesses are “sub-
ject to a single dominant creditor or a coordinated group of creditors.”
Nonetheless, few scholars have studied out-of-bankruptcy bargains be-
tween the owner-manager of a distressed small business and its dominant
creditors. This may reflect an implicit assumption that these bargains
tend to break down. Baird (1993) and Adler (1997), for example, note
that the going-concern value of a small or privately held business is tied
to the human capital of the owner-manager. This generates a game,
modeled explicitly by Baird and Picker (1991), in which the owner-
manager and the senior creditor bargain over the going-concern surplus.
The bargain, in these papers, is concluded in federal bankruptcy court.
The small business bargain could, however, be concluded outside
federal court. This point was emphasized recently by Mann (2004) in a
study of failed high-tech startups, all of which were backed by venture
capital. He found that only 22 percent of these startups were liquidated
under federal bankruptcy law. The remaining firms were liquidated under
state law, probably using the ABC process.2
1. Among businesses with fewer than 500 employees, roughly 541,000 shut down
between 2002 and 2003. In 2003, about 35,000 businesses (of any size) filed bankruptcy
petitions. Data on shutdowns are from U.S. Small Business Administration (2006a). Data
on bankruptcy filings are from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (2003).
2. Mann (2004) develops three theories that might explain the attractiveness of as-
signments for the benefit of creditors (ABCs) relative to federal law among high-tech start-
ups and among businesses generally. First, businesses will opt for federal bankruptcy law
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This paper shows that federal bankruptcy filings are equally rare
among distressed small businesses generally. Using unique data on dis-
tressed businesses located in Cook County, Illinois, I find that federal
law was used by only 16 percent of corporations and 20 percent of
noncorporate entities prior to liquidating or reorganizing. I also find that
one state procedure, the ABC, is nearly as popular as federal bankruptcy
law.
The paper also identifies conditions under which small businesses opt
for the federal code instead of state law alternatives. Following Schwartz
(1994) and White (1994), I model the choice between state and federal
law as the outcome of a bargaining game. State procedures, such as
workouts and ABCs, typically generate lower transaction costs than does
a federal bankruptcy case. The procedures may also create an oppor-
tunity to divert value from dispersed unsecured creditors whose claims
are too small to induce these creditors to monitor a state or federal
insolvency process. Coordination problems will also make it difficult for
these creditors to organize an involuntary bankruptcy filing.3 A distressed
small business will, therefore, opt for state procedures if its owner-
manager and senior lenders can agree on a division of the surplus gen-
erated by state procedures.
If a firm has no senior lenders—that is, if its debts are held entirely
by dispersed unsecured creditors with relatively small claims—the owner-
manager will always choose state procedures and capture the surplus
for herself. If the firm has one senior lender—a secured creditor or a
large unsecured lender—the owner will need the lender’s consent before
invoking a state procedure. The parties will therefore bargain over the
surplus. Bargaining may break down, and a federal bankruptcy filing
result, for the same reasons that any lawsuit may fail to settle out of
court: the lender may distrust the owner’s disclosures about the value
when they seek greater leverage in negotiations with landlords and other contractual coun-
terparties. The code, Mann notes, gives the debtor a unique opportunity to enforce leases
that would be unenforceable under state law and to terminate leases without incurring the
same liability that would arise under state law. Second, a business will opt for federal law
when it has made preferential payments to some creditors, to the disadvantage of others.
The Bankruptcy Code, Mann argues, offers a relatively low cost procedure for recovering
these payments. Finally, Mann hypothesizes that the popularity of ABC procedures will
vary by state because the procedures are more heavily regulated in some states than in
others. The less heavily the procedure is regulated, he reasons, the cheaper it is and the
more likely it will be used instead of federal law.
3. Generally, an involuntary bankruptcy petition needs the support of at least three
creditors who, together, have unsecured claims worth at least $13,475 (11 U.S.C. sec.
303[b][1] [2008]).
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of the firm’s assets, the owner may be overly optimistic about her payoffs
in a bankruptcy case (especially a Chapter 11 reorganization), or the
parties may simply make a mistake. If the firm has multiple senior lend-
ers, the risk of bargaining failure grows because of holdout problems.4
I test this theory using firm-level data from a random sample of
distressed small businesses located in Cook County. Among corporations
in these data, I find that the probability of a bankruptcy filing doubles
when the firm has secured debt, consistent with the simple bargaining
model. The probability rises even further when the firm must negotiate
with multiple secured lenders, which is also consistent with the theory
that coordination problems increase the likelihood of bargaining failure.
Finally, the probability of bankruptcy doubles if, in addition to having
multiple lenders, the small corporation has defaulted on multiple bank
loans. I interpret the latter pattern as evidence that a firm is more likely
to enter bankruptcy when senior lenders distrust the owner’s disclosures.
A small business’s access to credit depends heavily on its relationship
with senior lenders. The closer the relationship, the lower the infor-
mation asymmetry between the lender and borrower. When a firm de-
faults on bank debt, it undermines its relationship with senior lenders
and, consequently, reduces the expected quality of information provided
to lenders.
These dynamics help explain the rarity of bankruptcy among cor-
porations. Little, however, can be said about the rarity of bankruptcy
among noncorporate entities, such as proprietorships and partnerships.
Firm-level data show that these businesses are nearly 50 percent more
likely to enter bankruptcy when they have defaulted on bank debt, but
they are no more or less likely to enter bankruptcy when they carry
secured debt or have borrowed from multiple creditors. To some extent,
4. Although not explored here, the risk of bargaining failure may also depend on the
characteristics of state law procedures, which vary substantially across the United States.
An ABC, for example, is regulated by statute and overseen by courts in New York; it is
unregulated and requires no court involvement in Illinois. If a distressed firm is indebted
to both insiders and third-party creditors but pays the insiders first, state law authorizes
creditors to sue insiders in Massachusetts but not in Pennsylvania. Some state laws, then,
offer greater protection to creditors than do others. As Mann (2004) notes, these protections
generate transaction costs and could make state procedures less attractive than the federal
code. But they could also make the state procedures more attractive because they give
creditors greater authority to audit the firm and root out forms of self-dealing. If a firm
has a single senior lender, but the lender distrusts the owner’s disclosures, the risk of
bargaining failure—and the corresponding likelihood of a federal bankruptcy filing—may
be lower in states that give the lender greater authority to audit the business and sue the
owner if self-dealing is discovered.
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this may be unsurprising. A corporation can discharge its debts using
state law procedures simply by dissolving itself: once the corporation
dissolves, claims against it are effectively discharged. But the owner of
a proprietorship or partnership remains liable after the business entity
dissolves. This fact suggests that, in future work, data on noncorporate
entities should be analyzed using a bargaining model that accounts for
the owner’s personal liability.
These observations have implications for bankruptcy theory and pol-
icy. First, consistent with the work of Adler (1993) and Schwartz (1997,
1998), they show that corporations can, and often do, adopt capital
structures that avoid the need for federal bankruptcy filings. Although
federal bankruptcy law does serve the functions traditionally assigned
to it—remedying collective action and other coordination problems un-
der state law (Jackson 1986, pp. 7–19; Baird 1987)—these functions are
rarely needed by small business corporations.
In addition, this paper supports several theoretical arguments in the
corporate finance literature. The empirical results, for example, show
that a bankruptcy filing is more likely when a firm has multiple senior
lenders, not multiple junior lenders. This is consistent with the claim,
made by Bris and Welch (2005), that financial distress is more costly
when a firm’s debt is concentrated in the hands of a few dominant lenders
than when it is dispersed across a large number of claimants.
Finally, the results in this paper raise questions about current U.S.
policy regarding small business failure. Small businesses with fewer than
100 employees account for over 36 percent of employment and 27 per-
cent of annual revenue generated by all businesses in the U.S. economy.5
The federal government maintains a variety of policies designed to help
these businesses get started and to regulate their failure (many of these
policies are implemented by the Small Business Administration). These
policies assume, implicitly, that the Bankruptcy Code can be used to
regulate failure. Recent amendments to the code, for example, impose
reporting obligations, deadlines, and other burdens on Chapter 11 debt-
ors in order to improve payoffs to unsecured creditors (see Section 6).
These amendments ignore the decision-making process of businesses
choosing between state and federal procedures. Any regulation that in-
creases the burdens of federal bankruptcy law will make state law al-
ternatives more attractive. The recent amendments, then, may yield per-
5. The annual employment statistic reflects 2003 data; the revenue statistic reflects
2002 data. See U.S. Small Business Administration (2006b).
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verse outcomes for many firms: instead of increasing payoffs to
unsecured creditors, the amendments may only reduce aggregate payoffs
as these businesses substitute away from the code and toward state law.
Federal bankruptcy policy, then, should focus not only on federal law
itself but also on likely substitution effects toward state law alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 documents the rarity of
federal bankruptcy filings. Section 3 presents a simple model that isolates
the important differences between state and federal law and the trade-
offs facing a distressed small business. Section 4 summarizes the model’s
empirical implications, Section 5 tests these implications, Section 6 dis-
cusses the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2. BANKRUPTCY’S RARITY
Most discussions of small business distress assume that federal bank-
ruptcy law is the primary mechanism for resolving distress. That as-
sumption is counterfactual. Every year, hundreds of thousands of busi-
nesses close their doors, but only tens of thousands file petitions under
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
The rarity of small business bankruptcy has been questioned by Law-
less and Warren (2005), who argue that the annual number of federal
business filings is dramatically understated, owing to poor record keep-
ing by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO), which assem-
bles the PACER database. Instead of assessing whether a debtor’s lia-
bilities are primarily business debts, the AO relies on self-reporting. This
is problematic because most debtors submit their federal bankruptcy
filings using software that by default treats all debt as consumer debt
(Lawless and Warren 2005, pp. 767–71). Because the classification of
liabilities—business or consumer—matters little to most debtors (and
their lawyers), few alter the default setting. Put differently, even when
an individual debtor has significant business debt, her lawyer will typ-
ically use software designed for debtors with primarily consumer debt.
The result is that many cases involving business debts are classified, for
AO purposes, as consumer cases.
The underreporting problem is surely important, but it is not a com-
plete explanation for the rarity of federal business bankruptcy filings.
These filings were rare even before bankruptcy lawyers began using
consumer-oriented software in the early 1990s. In 1990, for example,
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Table 1. Auctions Listed in the Chicago Tribune “Auction Mart” during 1998
Auction N %
Total 302
Auctions mentioning company name 254
Bankruptcy filings 35 13.8
Listings mentioning assignment for the benefit
of creditors 34 13.4
business bankruptcy filings amounted to only 12 percent of all business
failures.6
Table 1 offers further proof that these aggregate patterns, drawn from
government records, coincide with actual practice. Every Monday and
Wednesday, the Business Section of the Chicago Tribune publishes an-
nouncements of business auctions. The announcements—collected under
the heading “Auction Mart”—typically identify the name of the business,
its location, the nature of its assets, and the date of the auction. The
announcement may also indicate whether the auction is pursuant to a
bankruptcy court order. Figure 1 reproduces a typical “Auction Mart”
page. I collected data from every “Auction Mart” published during cal-
endar year 1998. Table 1 summarizes the results. About 300 auctions
were announced, but a business name was given in only 254 cases. For
each named business, I determined whether it had filed a federal bank-
ruptcy petition in the Northern District of Illinois (which encompasses
Cook County) during the preceding 5 years. This was true in only 35
cases, which implies that federal bankruptcy law was used by only 13.8
percent of businesses being auctioned, which suggests that a significant
fraction of distressed businesses resolve distress without resorting to
federal law. In another 34 cases, the auction announcement indicated
that the business was being sold off in conjunction with an ABC. This
state procedure, then, was as common as federal bankruptcy law. Indeed,
it is highly likely that far more than 34 of the 254 businesses were
auctioned off pursuant to an ABC. Although an ABC auction must be
announced publicly, usually in a newspaper, there is no requirement that
the announcement indicate that the auction is part of an ABC.
6. I computed this figure by dividing total business filings, as reported by Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (2002), by the total number of business closures, as reported by
U.S. Small Business Administration (2006a).
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3. THEORY
Broadly speaking, federal law offers a relatively costly mechanism for
auditing distressed business and distributing payments to creditors. State
procedures are cheaper—they generate lower administrative expenses
and are faster and more private. But they are also less transparent.
Debtor businesses reveal less about their capital structures and can po-
tentially hide insider self-dealing and preferential treatment of particular
creditors.
State procedures will often be preferred by owner-managers. They
receive little payoff in federal bankruptcy court because the outstanding
debt typically exceeds the value of the firm’s assets and the code’s ab-
solute-priority rule forbids payments to equity holders unless creditors
are paid in full. Owners can benefit from a federal bankruptcy case if
the absolute-priority rule is violated (which seems to occur frequently,
as shown by Bris, Welch, and Zhu [2006]) or if the owner continues
running the business in bankruptcy (Baird and Morrison 2005). But the
same benefits may be available at lower cost under state procedures.
Because a federal case imposes significant costs on creditors, senior lend-
ers will be willing to pay owner-managers not to file a federal bankruptcy
petition. If the payment exceeds any benefits the owner might receive in
federal court, the owner will agree to use state insolvency procedures
instead.
But state procedures may not always be cheaper for senior lenders.
These procedures require the consent of secured creditors and lienhold-
ers. If these parties are large in number, coordination costs and holdup
problems may eliminate the gains from state procedures. In addition, it
may be difficult to audit a small business outside of a federal bankruptcy
case. The bankruptcy judge and U.S. Trustee can force the debtor to
reveal information about the business and its past transactions (11 U.S.C.
sec. 521). Creditors can also use the bankruptcy process to unwind
transactions that favored insiders or third parties (11 U.S.C. sec. 547
permits a trustee or the debtor in possession to recover these preferential
transfers). Bankruptcy law, in other words, protects creditors from in-
siders as well as from other (insider-favored) creditors. Outside federal
court, it may be impossible or very costly for creditors to conduct a
similarly rigorous audit. Thus, if senior lenders think that the owner
possesses private information about the value of business assets, they
may prefer a federal bankruptcy case to state procedures.
A business’s choice between state and federal law, then, is the product
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of a bargaining game between debtors and their senior lenders. The
dynamics of this game will depend heavily on the characteristics of state
law. These dynamics are best illustrated in the context of a simple model
that is close in spirit to the games studied by Baird and Picker (1991)
and Schwartz (1994).
3.1. A Simple Model
Consider a distressed small business corporation with a simple capital
structure: it has borrowed s on a secured basis from a bank and u on
an unsecured basis from n trade creditors with identical claims. The
business is distressed because total debt, , exceeds the value of itss u
assets a.
3.1.1. Federal Bankruptcy. At any time, the debtor can file a federal
bankruptcy petition. The filing initiates an automatic stay, that is, an
injunction prohibiting creditor collection efforts (11 U.S.C. sec. 362).
This injunction gives the debtor time to liquidate assets (often under
Chapter 7) or commence a bargaining process that may allow the debtor
to readjust its capital structure (Chapter 11). Creditor consent is un-
necessary. Indeed, the very purpose of the automatic stay is to force
nonconsenting creditors to participate in a collective proceeding.
A federal bankruptcy petition will generate transaction costs fort1
the debtor and for the bank, which must hire professionals to monitort2
the case. If the debtor does file a petition, the payoffs to the creditors
and owners will be dictated largely by the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute-
priority rule (11 U.S.C. sec. 1129[b]), although the owner may be able
to extract a small payoff b. This payoff can be viewed as a “bribe” to
induce the owner to speed up the bankruptcy process, or it can be viewed
as the owner’s bargained-for share of any going-concern surplus (see
Baird and Picker 1991, pp. 337–38). Secured creditors will receive the
value of their collateral; unsecured creditors will share pro rata in the
remaining value of the firm, minus the payoff extracted by the owner.7
In federal bankruptcy court, then, the bank’s net payoff will be
. If value remains after paying the bank, un-s pmin{s, a b t } tb 1 2
secured creditors will each receive . The owner willu p (a b s t )/nb 1
7. There are important complications, however. Among unsecured creditors, sections
507 and 726 of the code establish an additional priority scheme. Tax claims, for example,
receive eighth priority, meaning that tax collectors receive payment only if sufficient assets
exist to pay higher priority unsecured claims first (such as administrative costs and certain
employee wage and benefit claims). If sufficient assets do exist, tax claims will be paid in
full before any value is shared with general trade creditors.
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receive . I am assuming here that the owner has not personallyo p bb
guaranteed the debts of the business, which occurs frequently. If the
owner has personally guaranteed debts, or if the business is structured
as a proprietorship or partnership that lacks the limited liability of a
corporation, the creditors’ payoffs will depend on the value of both the
business’s assets and the owner’s personal assets.
3.1.2. State Procedures. Instead of filing a federal bankruptcy petition,
the debtor could use state procedures to resolve distress. Many proce-
dures are available. They include simple foreclosures, in which a bank
seizes and forces a sale of business assets; bulk sales, in which the debtor
sells most or all of its business to a third party and distributes proceeds
to creditors; and ABCs, in which the debtor assigns its business to a
trustee or assignee, who sells the business and distributes proceeds to
creditors (Chatz and Levy 2008). These procedures can be used to liq-
uidate or reorganize the business (Cohen and Challacombe 1990, p. 271;
Kupetz 2003, p. 18; Rally Capital Services 2009). To illustrate, suppose
the debtor would like to reorganize via an ABC. To do this, the owner-
manager will assign the business to an assignee and, at the same time,
enter an operating agreement in which the assignee agrees to employ
the owner-manager to run the business while the assignee prepares to
auction it off. At the auction, the owner-manager (or a new entity in
which the owner has a controlling interest) can bid on the assets, perhaps
with financing offered by a senior lender, which rolls over its claim.8 If
she offers the high bid—and she may be the only bidder at the auction9—
she will regain control of her firm. Importantly, the firm’s capital struc-
ture will have changed radically. Security interests and liens will remain;
they travel with the assets (Chatz and Levy 2008). But unsecured debt
will have been washed away.10
8. Stromberg (2000) observed the same phenomenon in Sweden, which auctions off
all firms in bankruptcy.
9. The ABC auctions likely share many of the infirmities seen in nonjudicial foreclosure
auctions, which are discussed by Nelson and Whitman (2004).
10. The same outcome could be achieved in other ways. The owner-manager could,
for example, permit the bank to foreclose and then repurchase the assets at the foreclosure
sale. But, relative to ABC, a foreclosure is typically unattractive to a debtor because she
exercises less control over the asset sale. The foreclosing creditor or a government official
will auction the assets. In addition, the owner-manager will be unable to continue running
the business after foreclosure. Even if she is able to repurchase the business at auction, the
delay between foreclosure and repurchase may be long enough to cause serious harm to
the business. A creditor may also prefer ABC over a foreclosure, as Berman (1993) explains,
because the ABC auction is conducted by an assignee, not the creditor, which insulates the
creditor from potential lender liability.
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These state procedures typically require the consent of senior lenders.
In the ABC process, for example, the debtor assigns assets to an assignee
subject to existing liens (Chatz and Levy 2008). Thus, nothing stops a
bank or other secured creditor from exercising its ordinary foreclosure
rights. Most loan agreements, for example, declare that default occurs
automatically when the debtor files a federal bankruptcy petition or
conducts an ABC.11 The assignment process triggers this covenant, al-
lowing the creditor to commence collection efforts and enforce security
interests.
Junior creditors, however, have little power to interfere with the ABC
process. Their consent is not required; it is presumed because the process
creates a trust that will divide assets equitably among the creditors (for
summaries of state laws regulating ABCs, see Glenn 1935, pp. 172–213;
Hanna 1949). Unsecured creditors can sue the assignee for breach of
fiduciary duties, but the incentive to monitor the ABC process will be
very low for most unsecured creditors, whose claims will be small relative
to the costs of monitoring. Unsecured creditors could try to halt the
ABC process by filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. However, it
is rare for creditors to attempt this, as Alper (2007, p. 1936) discusses,
because an involuntary petition requires coordination among at least
three creditors whose unsecured claims exceed $13,475 (11 U.S.C. sec.
303[b][1]). Because most unsecured creditors have small claims, coor-
dination problems will deter an involuntary filing. Another deterrent is
the possibility that, once the involuntary petition is filed, the bankruptcy
court will dismiss the case because it believes the ABC process is adequate
(Buckley and Sterling 2003).
State procedures typically generate lower transaction costs than does
a federal bankruptcy petition. The administrative costs of a federal bank-
ruptcy case, which include court fees and the professional fees of at-
torneys, can consume up to 10 percent of firm value (Bris, Welch, and
Zhu 2006, p. 1287). In a study of cases filed in the District of Arizona
and Southern District of New York between 1995 and 2001, most of
which were small business cases, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006, pp.
1281–82) found that the administrative costs of a Chapter 7 case av-
eraged about $12,000 while a Chapter 11 case averaged about $30,000.
In print, many practitioners and other observers—including Cohen and
Challacombe (1990, p. 270), Kupetz (2003, p. 18), Mann (2004, pp.
11. This observation is based on an interview with anonymous attorney on April 27,
2006.
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1392–93), and Scalambrino (2004)—have stated that state procedures
are cheaper. The cost savings come from several sources. First, because
state procedures are often managed by professional assignees, not courts,
there are fewer procedural roadblocks that slow the process. In addition,
the procedural hurdles in bankruptcy court—court fees, formal notice
to creditors, oversight by the U.S. Trustee—generate administrative costs
that are avoided in many state procedures (Mann 2004, pp. 1392–93).12
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we can normalize the
costs of state procedures to equal zero. Creditors’ priorities under state
law are largely similar to their priorities in bankruptcy. Secured creditors
will be paid first; unsecured creditors will be paid out of the remaining
assets.13 There are a few exceptions to this rule.14
Returning to the simple model, the bank and owner will generally
prefer state procedures because they yield the same outcomes (liquidation
or reorganization) at lower cost. The bank can avoid its own costs ;t2
the business can avoid costs . The total savings, , will be splitt t{ t  t1 1 2
between the bank and owner because the owner can credibly threaten
to file a bankruptcy petition if she does not receive some share of the
gains. Let d denote the owner’s share. Let the payoff to unsecured cred-
itors be . Assuming unsecured creditors receive the same payoff underup
state procedures as they do in federal court ( , an assumptionu p up b
relaxed in the next subsection), the bank’s payoff will be
s pmin{s, a b} (1 d)t.p
The owner-manager’s payoff will be . These equations yieldo p b dtp
two observations. First, state procedures allow the owner-manager to
enjoy a further deviation from the absolute-priority rule—a payoff even
when unsecured creditors are not paid in full—because the senior lender
12. In addition, the owner-manager often waits to commence state procedures until
she has found a buyer for the business (the buyer may be a new corporation organized by
the owner-manager).
13. Creditor priorities under state law are largely determined by contact. Priorities
under federal law are largely the same, with some important exceptions (see 11 U.S.C.
secs. 507, 725, 726, 1129). On the correspondence between state and federal law for
creditors of a distressed corporation, see Adler (2004).
14. One involves the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which can demand the right to
be paid in full before any other unsecured creditor receives payout (31 U.S.C. sec. 3713).
The IRS does not receive as high priority in bankruptcy (11 U.S.C. sec. 507[a][8]). Many
owner-managers are personally liable for business tax debts because they failed to ensure
that the business delivered payroll withholding taxes to the federal government. Because
the IRS receives greater priority under state law than in bankruptcy court, the owner-
manager may prefer a state proceeding in order to minimize her personal liability.
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and manager share the costs saved by not invoking federal law. This
deviation would occur even if . The more costly federal law is, thebp 0
greater the gains to the senior lender and manager and the lower the
payoffs to unsecured creditors.
Second, if the business has no secured debt, the owner will always
choose state procedures and keep for herself the costs avoided, . Em-t1
pirically, then, firms with no secured debt should be highly likely to
choose state procedures. Firms with one secured creditor should also be
highly like to choose state procedures, unless bargaining costs are high,
perhaps because of asymmetric information. I consider this possibility
in Section 3.2.
3.1.3. Diverting Value from Unsecured Creditors. The senior lender and
manager might try to divert the unsecured creditors’ payoff, , to them-up
selves. This will be especially attractive if it is costly for unsecured cred-
itors to identify firms with assets sufficient to yield payoffs in bank-
ruptcy—that is, firms for which . To illustrate,u p (a b s t )/n 1 0b 1
assume there are two types of businesses: type L firms with assets worth
and type H with assets , where . An unsecured creditor cana a a 1 al h h l
observe the two types but must incur cost c to verify this information
(c could, for example, represent the cost of filing an involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition). Because the assets of type L firms have low value, the
verification cost c may exceed any payoff to the unsecured creditor from
a federal bankruptcy filing; that is, . If so,u p (a  b s t )/nX cb1 l 1
unsecured creditors will not threaten to force these firms into federal
bankruptcy court even if their payoffs under state procedures areup1
below what they would receive in bankruptcy. Knowing this, senior
lenders and managers will divert any excess firm value to themselves,
leaving little or nothing for unsecured creditors. (A third party might
enter this market and recapture these gains. It might, for example, offer
to monitor debtors in exchange for a payment equal to from eachc/n
unsecured creditor. Under these conditions, type L firms would be forced
into bankruptcy only if .)u 1 c/nb1
In practice, type L firms may be large in number. Data from bank-
ruptcy courts suggest that very few businesses have sufficient assets to
ensure a nontrivial payoff to unsecured creditors. In Chapter 7 filings,
which make up about 60 percent of all business filings (Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts 2003), the typical payoff to unsecured creditors
is about 1 percent of the face value of the debt (Bris, Welch, and Zhu
2006, p. 1290), and most of this is likely paid to tax collectors (Baird,
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Bris, and Zhu 2005). The payoffs in Chapter 11 cases are rarely much
larger. As Morrison (2007, p. 392, table 6) shows, about 70 percent of
Chapter 11 cases are dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 cases. Among
cases that culminate in a reorganization, Baird, Bris, and Zhu (2005,
pp. 22–23) show that the payoff to nontax, unsecured claims is zero in
about 40 percent of cases and less than 10 percent overall among filings
by small businesses (those with assets worth less than $1 million). The
payoffs to unsecured creditors, then, are small in bankruptcy.
These statistics suggest that unsecured creditors will rarely object to
state procedures because bankruptcy cases rarely yield nontrivial pay-
offs. Moreover, unsecured creditors may not find it cost-effective to mon-
itor debtors and object when a federal bankruptcy case would yield larger
payoffs than would a state procedure. This will make state procedures
attractive to debtors, who can capture value that would be paid to
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy court.15
The foregoing analysis assumes, however, that state proceedings dis-
charge creditors’ claims and that they cannot subsequently bring suit
against the owner-manager personally. A suit against the owner-manager
would be possible if she had guaranteed the business debts or if the
business were organized as a proprietorship or partnership. The gains
to the owner-manager from state procedures will be highest when the
business is a corporation and the owner has not guaranteed the debts.
3.2. A Richer Model
The model thus far implies that state procedures will always be chosen
when a debtor suffers distress: senior lenders and managers receive
higher payoffs under state procedures than in federal court; unsecured
creditors may receive slightly lower payoffs but have no incentive to
force debtors into federal court. The model, however, makes two as-
sumptions: (1) there is only one senior lender, the bank, and (2) the
senior lender has perfect information about the debtor’s assets. When
these assumptions are relaxed, a distressed business may choose federal
bankruptcy law instead of state procedures.
3.2.1. Multiple Lenders. When a business has multiple senior lenders—
15. State procedures, such as ABCs, have long been seen as devices to shield insider
self-dealing, preferential payments to favored creditors, or other prepetition conduct that
would not withstand scrutiny in a federal bankruptcy court. Several (anonymous) practi-
tioners described ABCs in precisely these terms. The same theme is echoed by Weintraub,
Levin, and Sosnoff (1953, p. 4): “The general weakness of the out-of-court proceeding
. . . is its susceptibility to abuse.”
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several banks plus tax collectors and landlords—the likelihood of bar-
gaining failure increases. The gains from using state procedures—in the
form of costs avoided—must be divided among the lenders and shared
with the owner-manager to induce her to avoid a federal filing. Bar-
gaining over this surplus can lead to holdout problems because each
party knows that its consent is required before a state procedure can be
finalized. Each player—the lenders and the owner—will delay consenting
to state procedures in order to extract a greater fraction of the trans-
action costs avoided. Bargaining can also be costly. As the number of
senior lenders increases, so do the coordination costs, which may swamp
the gains from state procedures.16 If these kinds of problems are severe,
a debtor may be unable to use state procedures and be compelled to use
federal bankruptcy law.17
3.2.2. Asymmetric Information. The likelihood of a federal bankruptcy
filing may rise when it is costly for senior lenders to verify the value of
a debtor’s assets. Secured creditors have relatively strong information
about a business. As Scott (1986) and Triantis (1992) have shown, a
primary function of secured debt is to overcome information asymme-
tries: a security interest gives the lender power to monitor the business,
influence management prior to failure, and sanction misbehavior by seiz-
ing firm-specific assets. The lender’s broad hostage-taking power gives
the borrower strong incentives to disclose information and manage the
business prudently. Information asymmetries are not, of course, elimi-
nated by secured debt. Lenders may have incomplete information about
insider self-dealing or the debtor’s potential liability to third parties (for
example, torts).18 When a firm’s owners have private information about
the value of assets, a secured lender may prefer federal bankruptcy law
as a mechanism for verifying asset value. The incentive to use federal
law will be even stronger when there are multiple secured creditors, who
may have different beliefs about asset value.
As Webb (1987), Smith and Stromberg (2005), and others have em-
16. Mann (2004) hypothesized a similar dynamic, arguing that federal procedures will
be most attractive to larger businesses with more complicated capital structures.
17. The same point is made by Jackson (1982, p. 867): “The formal bankruptcy process
would presumably be used only when individualistic ‘advantage-taking’ in the setting of
multi-party negotiations makes a consensual deal too costly to strike—which may occur
frequently as the number of creditors increases.”
18. A large literature, including Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan
(1994), documents the importance of alternative mechanisms for overcoming information
asymmetries. One much-discussed mechanism is relationship-based lending.
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phasized, federal bankruptcy law serves an important auditing function.
A federal court offers a venue in which a debtor’s assets and liabilities
can be rigorously verified. After commencing a federal bankruptcy case,
the debtor or its trustee must file various reports (see 11 U.S.C. sec.
521). These lay bare the business’s financial position and operating his-
tory (a trustee manages the debtor’s assets in a Chapter 7 case). If the
owner of the business fails to submit this information, the case will
typically be dismissed.19 If the owner conceals information, she will be
sanctioned for contempt of court (see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020). In ad-
dition, the debtor or trustee is empowered to search for and attack insider
self-dealing and eve-of-bankruptcy payments to favored creditors (see,
for example, 11 U.S.C. secs. 544, 547, 548). Both actions protect the
rights of creditors to receive payment before equity holders and to receive
equal treatment among creditors of equal contractual priority. They also
provide a mechanism that protects senior creditors from self-dealing by
insiders and preferential treatment of junior creditors.
It may be more costly (or impossible) to conduct a rigorous audit
under state law. Return to the simple model of bargaining between the
senior lender and the owner of a distressed business. Suppose the lender
believes that the owner may be concealing information about the value
of business assets. The lender could enter a contract with the business,
offering to share the gains from using state procedures if the owner
consents to an audit of the business. But audits are expensive, and the
expense will deter a lender from auditing every distressed business. In-
stead, it will likely audit a random sample of firms, hoping to deter
owners from concealing information.
An audit in bankruptcy court may be cheaper for senior lenders.
When the lender audits a business outside federal court, it bears fully
the costs of the audit. When an audit is conducted in bankruptcy court,
the costs are shared with unsecured creditors. Indeed, the administrative
expenses of a bankruptcy case must be paid in full before unsecured
creditors receive any payout. Thus, even if an audit under state law
would be cheaper than one in federal court, a senior lender might still
prefer a federal court audit if its share of the auditing costs are lower.
Even if we put aside these cost-sharing issues, a senior lender may
prefer federal court even when the cost of an audit under state law is
lower than the lender’s own costs in federal court. An audit under state
19. This occurs frequently in Chapter 11 cases, as Baird and Morrison (2005, p. 2358)
document.
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law may be less effective than one in federal court. Outside federal court,
a senior lender may have little or no authority to force the owner to
disclose information about the business’s prior transactions or payments.
The lender may also lack authority to bring suit against owners for
certain kinds of self-dealing. To be sure, a lender could obtain this au-
thority through the terms of the loan agreement. The lender could, for
example, demand personal guarantees from owner-managers. Surpris-
ingly, however, guarantees are not demanded in a large number of small
business loans. According to Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1998), only
about 60 percent of small business corporations obtain loans with guar-
antees from insiders.20 When a lender has not obtained a guarantee from
insiders, an audit under state law may be less effective than one in federal
court.21 An Appendix illustrates these points in the context of a simple
model.
4. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The theory outlined in the previous section has two empirical implica-
tions: the probability of a bankruptcy filing will rise among distressed
businesses when (1) the business has multiple senior lenders and (2)
information asymmetries prevent senior lenders from gauging the value
of business assets. In Section 5, I propose various proxies for businesses
with these characteristics. Businesses with multiple senior lenders, for
example, may have more than one bank lender, have incurred tax debts
(which may give rise to liens), or face suits filed or judgments obtained
by unsecured creditors. Once an unsecured creditor reduces its claim to
a judgment, it typically obtains a lien claim against the debtor’s assets.
Similarly, a proxy for asymmetric-information problems is whether the
20. Using data on businesses in bankruptcy, Baird and Morrison (2005, p. 2362)
observe a similar rate of (nontax) personal guarantees.
21. The lender may be able to conduct more rigorous audits in some states than in
others. For example, Iowa, New York, and Texas have adopted fairly comprehensive reg-
ulations governing the ABC process. (For a detailed comparison of statutory and nonsta-
tutory regimes across the United States, see Weintraub, Levin, and Sosnoff [1953, pp.
14–25].) These rules increase the information available from an audit and enhance the
power of senior lenders to recover assets from insiders and third parties. The ABC process
is far less regulated in California, Illinois, Nevada, and Virginia. There is generally neither
court involvement nor public notice. No documents are filed with a court; no announce-
ments are posted in newspapers. Even credit-reporting bureaus, such as Dun & Bradstreet
(D&B), typically do not know whether a business used a state procedure. All they know
is that the business faded away.
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Business has secured debt 
Business has multiple senior lenders 
Information asymmetries:a
Relationship with bank has deteriorated 
Shocks:a
Business faces pending suits and judgments 
Business recently changed 
Priorities:a
Business has tax debt 
Business rents real estate 
Owner-manager is member of a minority group or female 
a The hypothesis will matter more for corporations than for noncorporations.
business has defaulted on senior debt or been habitually late in payments.
This kind of behavior damages the business’s relationship with the senior
lender, who may become more skeptical about the owner-manager’s re-
ports.22
Table 2 summarizes these and several other hypotheses that can be
drawn from the discussion in Section 3. First, the greater the number
of creditors and the more severe the information asymmetries, the more
likely a firm will invoke the federal code. Second, if a firm’s capital
structure is relatively complex or if it has suffered a financial shock,
resulting in a rush of creditors bringing collection efforts, it may be
unable to obtain quick consent from key creditors (see also Mann 2004,
p. 1409). It may feel compelled to file a federal bankruptcy petition in
22. Information problems could be mitigated by laws that promote the transparency
of state procedures, such as regulations that police insider self-dealing. The owner of a
distressed business has strong incentives to favor herself because a large fraction of small
business debt—about 25 percent among businesses with fewer than 20 employees—is typ-
ically owed to insiders or other individuals who are likely related to insiders (Berger and
Udell 2002, pp. F35–F36). Thus, fraudulent-conveyance law may be particularly valuable
to senior lenders, as it allows creditors to sue insiders who received payments when the
business was insolvent. This suggests that state procedures may be more popular in states
with strong fraudulent-conveyance laws. These laws are largely the same across the 50
states, with one important exception: only 38 states have adopted section 5(b) of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which gives creditors power to sue any insider who
receives payment on account of antecedent debt while the business is insolvent. If section
5(b) is an important device for senior creditors, state procedures will be more commonly
used in states that have adopted this provision of the act than in those that have not.
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order to protect its assets via the automatic stay.23 A rush of creditors
is likely, for example, when a business has suffered a fire or burglary or
when it has experienced an unexpected financial shortfall following un-
successful expansion or other change of business.
Third, because creditor priorities differ under state and federal law,
a distressed business may favor the legal procedure that minimizes the
owner’s personal liability or limits the claims of particular creditors. As
explained in Section 3.1, the IRS receives higher priority, relative to other
unsecured or unperfected creditors, in state procedures than in federal
bankruptcy court. If the owner of a corporation has personally guar-
anteed federal tax debts, as Baird and Morrison (2005, p. 2356) show
is often the case, she may prefer state procedures because they ensure a
higher payout to the IRS and therefore reduce her personal liability.
Conversely, as Berman (1993, p. 361) notes, a business may be less likely
to favor state law when the business leases real estate or other assets.
In federal bankruptcy court, the debtor can enforce lease contracts even
if it has committed a material breach that would, under state law, entitle
the lessor to terminate the contract (11 U.S.C. sec. 365[b], [f]). In ad-
dition, in bankruptcy a debtor can breach a lease contract and cap the
damages otherwise payable to the landlord under state law (11 U.S.C.
sec. 502[b][6]).
Fourth, an owner’s gains from state procedures will be larger when
the business is organized as a corporation than when it has adopted a
legal form without limited liability. If a proprietorship uses a state pro-
cedure, the owner remains personally liable even after the procedure
ends. She can avoid this liability only by filing a bankruptcy petition.
Even if senior lenders would agree not to bring suit against the owner
personally, it would be prohibitively costly to obtain the same agreement
from all unsecured creditors. Thus, the primary implications of the model
23. When a debtor files a federal bankruptcy petition, an injunction issues, enjoining
all creditor collection efforts. The injunction applies equally to creditors who have obtained
liens but not levied upon property, those who have suits pending, and those preparing to
bring suit or assert self-help remedies. The automatic stay gives the debtor time to conduct
an orderly liquidation or negotiate a plan of reorganization. State bankruptcy procedures
offer significantly less protection to a debtor harassed by creditors. A bulk sale does nothing
to stop a creditor from bringing suit against the debtor and perhaps even the buyer. When
a business conducts an ABC, the assets are protected from most collection efforts, but
creditors with liens may enforce those liens. In addition, creditors are free to bring suit
against the debtor personally. Of course, if the debtor is a corporation, the assignment
typically involves dissolution of the business, making moot any suits against the debtor
itself.
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in Section 3—multiple creditors and asymmetric information—should
be observable among corporations but perhaps not among other business
forms.
Finally, the demographic characteristics of the business or its owner
may affect the probability of a bankruptcy filing. Blanchflower, Levine,
and Zimmerman (2003), for example, find evidence that minority-owned
small businesses face discrimination in credit markets. If lenders are
unwilling to refinance distressed minority-owned firms, these firms may
find Chapter 11 attractive because it offers a court-supervised oppor-
tunity to reorient business operations and bargain with prepetition cred-
itors. To be sure, credit market discrimination may reduce opportunities
for minority-owned firms to grow in size. And if minority-owned busi-
nesses are relatively small, they may be less able to afford the federal
bankruptcy process. Conditional on size, however, the existence of credit
market discrimination could increase the probability that a minority-
owned distressed business will file a federal bankruptcy petition.24 The
same dynamics might be present in women-owned small businesses, but
empirical studies find no evidence of capital market discrimination (see,
for example, Kalleberg and Leicht 1991).
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Ideal data would permit a comparison of two groups of distressed busi-
nesses: (1) those that filed federal bankruptcy petitions prior to shutting
down or restructuring (bankruptcy exits) and (2) those that used state
law procedures, such as ABC, to accomplish the same goals (state exits).
With such data in hand, the following model could be used to evaluate
factors that make a federal bankruptcy filing more or less likely:
E[BankruptcyExit ]p F(Hypotheses , Controls ). (1)i i i
Here F(. . .) is the cumulative density function for a particular distribu-
tion, usually normal (for a probit) or logistic (logit). BankruptcyExiti is a
24. Dawsey and Ausubel (2002), however, find the opposite pattern in their study of
distressed consumers, who can discharge debt by filing a federal bankruptcy filing or by
forcing creditors to pursue collection under state law. Because many creditors will charge
off a debt instead of pursuing collection, Dawsey and Ausubel argue that distressed con-
sumers face a choice between formal bankruptcy (a federal filing) and informal bankruptcy
(placing the burden on creditors to assert state law remedies). The authors find that members
of minority groups are more likely than other borrowers to choose informal bankruptcy.
The authors do not, however, offer a theory that might explain this pattern.
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 15:06:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
276 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 8 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 0 9
dummy variable equal to one if firm i is a member of the bankruptcy exit
group and zero otherwise. Hypothesesi is a vector of proxies for the hy-
potheses in Table 2, and Controlsi is a vector of variables that accounts
for other possible determinants of a firm’s decision to file for federal
bankruptcy.
Model 2 requires data on two groups, bankruptcy exits and state
exits. Ideal data do not exist, but we get close to the ideal using records
assembled by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), a credit-reporting bureau.
5.1. Data
Dun & Bradstreet gathers financial and operational information about
the majority of businesses in the United States. The U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) (2006b) estimates that about 25 million firms were
active in the U.S. economy during 2004. Dun & Bradstreet’s records for
roughly the same period included about 18 million firms, 72 percent of
the SBA total.25 Missing from D&B’s database are businesses with no
debt. Dun & Bradstreet’s mission is to offer reliable information about
the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. A business usually does not
enter D&B’s database until a bank or trade creditor seeks (or reports)
information about the business. This selection bias seems unimportant
for the analysis here, which evaluates the choice between state and fed-
eral law among distressed, indebted businesses. A business without debt
generally will not consider a bankruptcy filing.
Dun & Bradstreet’s records include the credit history, annual sales,
employment, location, and other characteristics of businesses.26 Dun &
Bradstreet also tracks the financial condition of every business using a
proprietary index, the Financial Stress Score (FSS), which ranges from
1 to 5. Scores above 3 are indicative of distress; an FSS equal to 5
represents severe distress. The index is strongly correlated with the like-
lihood of suspending operations. Among firms with an FSS equal to 1,
the probability of closing within 1 year is .5 percent. Among firms with
an FSS equal to 4 or 5, the probability is 8 percent and 36 percent,
respectively.
Dun & Bradstreet records depart from the ideal in several respects.
They indicate whether a business shut down and whether it filed for
bankruptcy. But if a business shut down without filing a bankruptcy
25. This information was supplied by D&B in response to the author’s query.
26. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs is based on information sup-
plied by D&B in response to the author’s queries.
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petition, the records do not indicate whether the business used a par-
ticular state procedure to liquidate or reorganize, merged with another
firm, or shut down because the owner decided to move out of state or
on to new projects. Thus, the population of business shutdowns includes
distressed businesses that shut down or reorganized using state law (state
exits) as well as healthy businesses that shut down because there were
better uses for the physical assets or the owner’s human capital (healthy
exits). For this study, only state exits are relevant. I isolate this group,
as explained below, by focusing on businesses with high FSSs. In general,
I assume that a shutdown is a state exit if the business (a) exited without
filing a bankruptcy petition during the preceding 3 years and (b) exited
at a time when its FSS equaled 4 or 5 (in some tests, I focus on highly
distressed firms with an FSS equal to 5).
Another shortcoming of the D&B data is the limited information
about a business’s capital structure. The data indicate whether, when,
how often, and on what terms a business has borrowed from a bank or
purchased goods on credit. They also indicate whether the business is
late in making payments. But the records do not tell us the total value
of the business’s assets or liabilities. Thus, we do not know how leverage
varies across businesses in the database. We must infer this from various
proxies, such as the FSS, the size of the firm (measured in terms of sales
or employment), and whether the business took on secured debt.27
5.2. Sample Selection
Because D&B data are expensive, I limited my analysis to a sample of
small, privately held businesses located in Cook County, Illinois. I define
a small business as one with 500 or fewer employees. In 1998, D&B
maintained records on nearly 160,000 privately held businesses in Cook
County, about 99 percent of which had 500 or fewer employees.
As a preliminary step, I drew a sample of 2,000 businesses that were
operating as of January 1, 1998. As Table 3 illustrates, the sample was
27. The D&B data are also noisy. Data on a firm’s annual sales are available for some
years but not others. When these data are available, the same sales volume may be reported
for multiple years, which suggests that D&B reproduced data from past years when it was
unable to contact a business in the current year. Along the same lines, important variables,
such as the gender of the owner and whether the business rents or owns real estate, are
missing for a large number of businesses. Some of these problems, such as missing or
duplicate sales data, can be minimized by computing annual averages for each business.
The averages will moderate the noisiness. Other problems, such as underreporting of gender
and real estate ownership, can be ignored if I assume that reporting biases do not differ
across the two groups that are the focus of this paper: bankruptcy exits and state exits.
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stratified. A third of the sample consisted of businesses in high distress
(FSS equal to 5), another third of businesses in moderate distress (FSS
equal to 4), and a final third of businesses in low or no distress (FSS
below 4). Within each third, the sample was split evenly between cor-
porations and noncorporations (partnerships and proprietorships). For
each business, D&B provided annual financial and operational infor-
mation for every year from 1998 through 2004 or until the business
terminated operations, whichever occurred earlier.
This exploratory analysis confirmed the rarity of federal bankruptcy
filings. Table 3 shows that among corporations in high distress (FSS
equal to 5) on January 1, 1998, nearly 50 percent ceased operations
within 7 years. Among those that shut down, only 15.6 percent filed a
federal bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy rate is a bit higher (16.9
percent) among noncorporations. These percentages measure the bank-
ruptcy rate among all exiting businesses, regardless of whether they were
distressed at the time of exit. When the sample is limited to businesses
that exited in distress, as the final columns of Table 3 do, the percentages
rise slightly. It may seem odd that some bankruptcies are not distressed
bankruptcies in Table 3. Among high-distress corporations, the number
of bankruptcies is 25, but the number of distressed bankruptcies is 20.
Because it is unlikely that a healthy business would file for bankruptcy,
the disparity most likely reflects measurement error. It is not uncommon
for D&B to know that a business filed for bankruptcy but have little
additional information about it. Such a business may have a low FSS
only because D&B lacks sufficient information to assign an accurate
score. The analysis below will generally focus on bankruptcy filings by
businesses that, on the basis of D&B records, were distressed at the time
of filing.28
Given the rarity of bankruptcy exits, a simple random sample will
not yield enough bankruptcy exits and state exits to implement model
2. An attractive alternative is choice-based sampling (see Waldman 2000;
Scott and Wild 1986). Instead of sampling the population of all small
businesses, I drew samples from two subpopulations: businesses that
suffered distress between 1998 and 2000 and either (1) filed for bank-
ruptcy (bankruptcy exits) or (2) shut down without filing (state exits)
prior to 2005. This sampling methodology has the advantage of cost-
28. This restriction has little effect on the analysis, however. In general, the patterns
reported below do not change when the analysis is broadened to include all bankruptcies,
regardless of the level of distress.
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Table 4. Dun & Bradstreet Sample 1: Businesses Active on January 1, 1998, Followed
through 2004: Choice-Based Sample
State Exits Bankruptcy Exits
Sample Population Sample Population
High distress (FSS p 5):
Corporations 250 272 77 77
Noncorporations 177 177 40 40
Moderate distress (FSS p 4):
Corporations 250 533 157 157
Noncorporations 250 417 90 90
effectiveness. The downside is that it distorts the representativeness of
the overall sample. For any given business in the choice-based sample,
the probability of selection differs from the probability of selecting the
same businesses at random from the general population. This compli-
cation, however, has a simple fix: the data can be weighted by the prob-
ability of selection.
Applying this methodology, I drew 927 state exits and 364 bank-
ruptcy exits. As Table 4 shows, the sample of state exits represents about
66 percent of all such exits in the population; the sample of bankruptcy
exits accounts for 100 percent of these exits. Within each group, the
samples are divided between businesses in high distress (FSS equal to 5)
and moderate distress (FSS equal to 4) and between corporations and
noncorporations. Each subgroup is a random sample from the relevant
subpopulation. For each business, the data include annual financial and
operational data from 1994 through 2004.
Together, the samples in Tables 3 and 4 represent the primary data
for the tabular and multivariate analysis that follows. I compare state
exits with bankruptcy exits among the subset of distressed businesses.
This is a valid way to test theories regarding the choice between state
law procedures and federal bankruptcy law if my measure of distress is
accurate. It is probably safe to assume that all bankruptcy exits involve
distressed businesses. Among state exits, however, it is possible that some
of these exits involve businesses that appear distressed but are in fact
solvent. I treat a business as distressed if its financial stress score (FSS)
exceeds 3, but Table 3 shows that many distressed firms never shut down.
Among corporations with an FSS equal to 5 in January 1998, for ex-
ample, only 48 percent exited within the following 7 years; the per-
centage is 30 for corporations with an FSS equal to 4. Thus, there is a
risk that in comparing state exits with bankruptcy exits, I am making
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Table 5. D&B Sample 2: Businesses That Closed during 1998–2000
State Exits Bankruptcy Exits
Sample Population Sample Population
Distressed (FSS p 4 or 5):
Corporations 250 569 295 295
Noncorporations 250 459 256 256
Not distressed (FSS ! 4):
Corporations 427 1,041
Noncorporations 423 565
two comparisons simultaneously: (1) state exits versus bankruptcy exits,
among distressed businesses, and (2) state exits by healthy businesses
versus bankruptcy exits by distressed businesses. I am interested in com-
parison 1, not 2.
I evaluate this potential problem below by running the analysis sep-
arately for two samples: one consisting of both moderately and highly
distressed businesses (FSS equal to 4 or 5) and one limited to highly
distressed businesses with an FSS equal to 5. State exits involving healthy
businesses will be more common in the former group than in the latter.
If some patterns are important in the first sample but not in the second,
they probably tell us little about the choice between state and federal
law among distressed businesses. They instead tell us something about
the difference between healthy and distressed businesses.
Another way to evaluate this problem is to identify patterns that
distinguish healthy and distressed businesses and compare these with
patterns that distinguish state exits from bankruptcy exits. To make this
comparison, I gathered data on apparently healthy (FSS below 4) and
distressed (FSS equal to 4 or 5) businesses that shut down during the
period 1998–2000. As Table 5 illustrates, the sample includes about
1,000 exits by distressed businesses and over 850 by healthy businesses.
5.3. Variables
The central hypotheses of this paper are that the probability of a federal
bankruptcy filing rises as (1) the number of senior lenders increases and
(2) information asymmetries become more severe. The D&B data con-
tain various proxies for the number of senior lenders, as summarized in
Table 6. One is the number of times secured creditors have filed financing
statements that record security interests in assets owned by the debt. A
secured creditor will generally file a Uniform Commerical Code (UCC)
Financing Statement (Form UCC-1) with the Illinois Secretary of State.
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These statements are publicly available and summarized in the D&B
data. Additional proxies are the number of banks that submitted infor-
mation to D&B about loans to a particular business and whether the
public records report any liens filed against the business.
A useful proxy for information asymmetries is whether a lending bank
reported that its relationship with the debtor business has deteriorated
because of defaults, habitually late payment, or other factors. Given the
importance of relationship banking in small business lending, it seems
reasonable to infer that a bank will put less trust in a debtor’s disclosures
if the bank’s relationship with the debtor has deteriorated. Another
proxy is the age of the business. Because most businesses maintain a
relationship with a single bank, the age of the business may be a good
proxy for the duration of its relationship with the bank. The longer the
relationship, the less likely there is an important information asymmetry
between the bank and the debtor.
Section 4 identifies several other factors that may affect the choice
between state and federal procedures. Federal law may be attractive to
businesses that operate in rented real estate. Relative to state law, the
code gives the debtor greater bargaining power with respect to landlords.
Federal law may also be attractive to businesses that have suffered fi-
nancial shocks or face a rush of creditors bringing suit. These businesses
may not have sufficient time to invoke state procedures; they may need
the benefit of the code’s automatic stay immediately. The D&B data
indicate whether a business faces suits and judgments. They also indicate
whether it has undergone a recent change in ownership, name, or lo-
cation. These kinds of changes usually occur during a period of insta-
bility, suggesting the occurrence of a shock.
Other variables, summarized in Table 6, could also affect the like-
lihood that a distressed business enters federal bankruptcy court. These
include the debtor’s size (as measured by sales and employment), its
relationship with trade creditors, whether the business filed a bankruptcy
petition in the past, and the race and gender of the owner. Another
potentially important variable for a proprietorship is whether the owner-
manager has made tangible, personal investments in the business. The
business, for example, might be operated from the owner’s home.
5.4. Summary Statistics
Tables 7 and 8 provide summary statistics for all sample businesses and
for corporations in particular. Although the D&B data include annual
observations for every business, I was unable to exploit this time vari-
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ation. The data are noisy: in many cases, for example, variables such as
sales or employment are the same for several years. Because of such
problems, I treated the data as cross-sectional. For each business, I com-
puted averages for each of the variables in the database. In most cases,
the average is based on the 3 years preceding the date of shutdown or
bankruptcy filing. Thus, Tables 7 and 8 compare state exits to bank-
ruptcy exits during the 3 years preceding exit.
Overall, the sample businesses are quite small. The average business
has 15 employees and annual sales of $1.45 million. It has been in
operation at least 10 years (based on management tenure) and perhaps
as many as 14 years (based on D&B’s estimate of firm age, which appears
to be biased upward).29 Over half of the businesses operate in the services
and retail sectors; another 26 percent operate in construction and whole-
sale. The corporations in the sample are slightly larger (around 19 em-
ployees and annual sales of about $2 million) and have greater repre-
sentation in the manufacturing sector.
Tables 7 and 8 present puzzling data on the gender and race of the
owner-manager. Women-owned businesses account for less than 7 per-
cent of businesses; minority-owned businesses account for at most 9
percent. In data collected by the Federal Reserve (see Bitler, Robb, and
Wolken 2001), these percentages are much larger: 24 percent for women-
owned businesses and 15 percent for minority-owned businesses. The
differences could reflect flawed data collection by D&B.
Comparing state exits and bankruptcy exits, the tables show that
businesses with bankruptcy exits tend to have slightly fewer employees
but slightly greater annual sales than businesses with state exits. They
are much more likely to involve businesses that have filed bankruptcy
petitions before and to be concentrated in the construction sector.
Bankruptcy exits also differ from state exits along many of the mar-
gins suggested by the simple model of Section 3. First, state exits are
significantly less likely to involve secured debt. A business without se-
cured debt is more likely to use state procedures because it faces none
of the problems—coordination problems among senior lenders and
asymmetric information—that can prevent a business with secured debt
from using state law. Second, bankruptcy exits are significantly more
likely to involve businesses with multiple UCC filings and multiple banks,
consistent with the hypothesis that the probability of a federal filing rises
29. In many cases, the age reported in D&B records is greater than the age that the
business reported to the Illinois Secretary of State.
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with the number of creditors. Finally, the debtor’s relationship with its
senior lenders is significantly worse among businesses that invoke federal
law. This too is consistent with the hypothesis that federal bankruptcy
filings are more likely when asymmetric information problems are sig-
nificant.
Other hypotheses find support in Tables 7 and 8 as well. Bankruptcy
exits are more likely to involve businesses that operate from rented
facilities, consistent with Mann’s (2004) hypothesis. Also, bankruptcy
exits are more likely to involve businesses facing suits and judgments,
which suggests that a business facing time constraints is less able to use
state procedures.
5.5. Results
Table 9 reports estimates of model 2, assuming that F(. . .) follows a
logistic distribution. The data are limited to distressed businesses with
FSS equal to 4 or 5. The dependent variable, BankruptcyExit, equals
one if a business filed a bankruptcy petition within 3 years of shutting
down and zero otherwise. Standard errors are robust, all continuous
variables are logged, and the data are weighted by (the inverse of) their
sampling probabilities. Thus, a ratio above (below) one implies that the
covariate is positively (negatively) correlated with the probability of a
bankruptcy filing.
Column 1 presents a simple regression with two proxies each for the
number of senior lenders and for information asymmetries. The results
are largely consistent with the tabular comparisons in Tables 7 and 8.
The probability of filing for bankruptcy rises significantly among busi-
nesses with secured debt, liens, and sour relationships with senior lend-
ers—all consistent with the central hypotheses of this paper that federal
cases are more likely when a business has secured debt, multiple senior
lenders, and private information about the value of its assets. The age
of the business, as proxied by management tenure, is negatively corre-
lated with the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing, but the estimates are
only marginally significant. This too is consistent with the hypothesis
that lenders have greater information about old firms, which probably
have longstanding relationships with their lenders.
These effects are economically significant. Column 1, for example,
reports that the average marginal effect of having any UCC filings is
.114, which means that the probability of a federal bankruptcy filing
rises .114 when a distressed corporation has incurred secured debt. Given
that the unconditional probability of a bankruptcy filing is .168 (see
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Table 8), the presence of secured debt raises the probability of a bank-
ruptcy filing to about .278, a 65 percent increase. Poor banking history
has a comparable effect.
Other hypotheses appear to play a less important role in determining
the choice between state and federal law. A business that rents its facility
is more likely to use federal law, as Mann (2004) predicted, but the
effect is not significant. The lack of significance, however, is partly the
product of strong multicollinearity between this variable and two oth-
ers—having any suits and judgments (correlation equal to .23) and hav-
ing a poor trade credit history (correlation equal to .20). When only
one of these variables is included in the analysis, that variable becomes
marginally significant, as column 2 illustrates.
The estimates in columns 1 and 2 are drawn from a sample of dis-
tressed corporations. Column 3 reestimates the model on the subsample
of distressed partnerships and proprietorships. The importance of se-
cured debt largely disappears, but the debtor’s relationship with its bank
remains an important determinant of federal filings. Other hypotheses,
such as whether the business rents its facility, seem not to matter. The
probability of a federal filing by a proprietorship or partnership rises
substantially if the business operates out of the owner’s home (although
the estimate is only marginally significant).
Columns 1–3 include any business with an FSS equal to 4 or 5. If
state exits include a significant number of healthy firms—because the
FSS variable is not perfectly correlated with distress—the reported es-
timates are biased. To address this possibility, column 4 reestimates
model 2 using the subsample of corporations with the highest FSS (equal
to 5). The overall results do not change. The statistical significance of
some coefficients falls, but this is unsurprising because the sample size
has fallen by about 50 percent. Overall, the estimates in column 4 suggest
that the patterns in Table 9 are not biased by the presence of healthy
exits among the businesses that chose state over federal law.
Table 10 augments the basic empirical model to include a richer set
of proxies for the number of creditors and for information asymmetries.
As in the basic model, the presence of multiple secured lenders markedly
increases the probability of a federal filing by distressed corporations
(see columns 1 and 3). The probability of bankruptcy also rises when
the business has only one secured lender. I treat this as evidence that
even with a single senior lender, bargaining failure may occur because
of information asymmetries or other problems.
Table 10 offers additional evidence that information asymmetries are
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important. In columns 1 and 3, the probability of a federal filing is
substantially larger when a small business corporation has harmed its
relationship with multiple lenders. Interestingly, it is unclear whether the
probability of bankruptcy rises when there has been only one report
that the business has defaulted or otherwise harmed its relationship with
its bank lender. The coefficient is marginally significant in column 1 but
insignificant when the sample is limited to highly distressed corporations
in column 3.
Finally, column 4 redefines the dependent variable to equal one when
a distressed business exits and zero when a nondistressed business exits.
This model, then, compares distressed exits to healthy exits. About 44
percent of exits are distressed exits. The estimates reported in column
4 are very large but qualitatively similar to those in the other columns
of Table 10: relative to healthy exits, distressed exits are much more
likely to involve firms with significant secured debt, liens, suits and judg-
ments, poor relationships with creditors, and prior bankruptcy filings.
Healthy exits, then, differ from distressed exits along largely the same
margins that distressed exits differ from bankruptcy exits. This suggests
that firms in bankruptcy tend to be more distressed than firms that use
state procedures, and both types of firms are more distressed than healthy
businesses that shut down. This conclusion is somewhat unsurprising:
a major determinant of a distressed business’s choice between state and
federal law—its relationship with senior lenders—is undoubtedly a major
factor used by D&B in assessing the business’s distress level.30
6. DISCUSSION
The results in Section 5 are consistent with the hypothesis that, among
small businesses, federal bankruptcy filings are the result of bargaining
failure between the business and its senior lenders. A distressed business
30. As an exploratory exercise, an early draft of this paper used state-level data to test
the correlation between features of state insolvency laws and the rate with which failing
businesses file federal bankruptcy petitions. Filings are significantly more common in some
states (such as Nevada) than in others (such as North Dakota) and could be due to variation
in state laws. Preliminary analysis showed a robust negative correlation between corporate
Chapter 11 filings (per 1,000 business deaths) and the presence of laws regulating pref-
erential payments to insiders (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, sec. 5[b]). These results
are not reported here because the correlation is at best suggestive: it could be due to
unobservable variables and may be biased by the endogeneity of states’ decisions to adopt
laws regulating preferential payments to insiders.
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is significantly more likely to file for bankruptcy if it needs the consent
of a bank, the IRS, or other senior creditor to pursue state procedures.
And it is unlikely to obtain consent if the number of senior creditors is
large or if the creditors suspect that the owner has private information
about the value of business assets. The choice between state and federal
law, these data suggest, is a choice made by a firm’s senior creditors.
The control exercised by senior creditors can have two important
effects on the resolution of distress in small businesses. First, it can reduce
the ex post costs of financial distress. Relative to federal law, state pro-
cedures are generally faster, generate lower administrative costs, and
impose fewer burdens on senior lenders (such as the federal rule denying
interest payments to undersecured creditors). They also offer a simpler
alternative to Chapter 11, which is frequently criticized as an overly
cumbersome reorganization mechanism for small businesses. Senior
creditors effectively sort businesses between cheaper, less transparent
state procedures and more expensive federal procedures that offer a more
rigorous audit of the business. When senior debt exceeds the value of
the business assets, these creditors are effectively the owners of the assets
and therefore have appropriate incentives to sort businesses in a way
that maximizes the return. Business owners consent to this process be-
cause they will receive little or nothing in bankruptcy but could receive
a meaningful payoff in a state proceeding. They can demand a payoff
because they are always free to file a bankruptcy petition, which will
impose costs on senior lenders.
This points to a second effect of senior-creditor control: senior cred-
itors and business owners may collude to divert value from junior cred-
itors. With senior-creditor assistance, a business may use state procedures
that make it difficult for junior creditors to uncover prior fraud or to
determine whether the value of business assets exceeds the secured
claims. The business may be sold at an auction with few, if any, bidders
other than the previous owner, whose bid may be financed by senior
creditors and yield no payoff to anyone other than the seniors. Junior,
unsecured creditors will rarely object to this process. Their claims are
too small to warrant monitoring the proceeding.31
The potential for this dynamic—collusion among senior creditors and
business owners—is a longstanding problem in state procedures. Indeed,
Skeel (2001, pp. 64–65) notes that precisely the same dynamic char-
31. Several lawyers reported that if a junior creditor does object, the dispute will often
be settled by means of a payment that convinces the creditor to withdraw the objection.
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acterized equity receiverships around the turn of the twentieth century
and led to the Supreme Court’s decision announcing the absolute-priority
rule (see also Baird and Rasmussen 1999). Ex ante, of course, this dy-
namic will induce junior creditors to restrict or raise the price of credit.
These observations suggest several possible directions for U.S. bank-
ruptcy policy. They suggest, first, that current policy regarding small
business bankruptcy is often self-defeating. Because federal bankruptcy
law competes with state procedures, any reform to or interpretation of
federal law will have two effects: it will alter payoffs to creditors and
shareholders in bankruptcy (the intensive margin) as well as the bar-
gaining between entrepreneurs and senior creditors over the choice be-
tween state and federal procedures (the extensive margin). Reforms that
try to improve payoffs to junior creditors in bankruptcy, at the expense
of shareholders, will tend to make state procedures more attractive to
the debtor. The dynamic along the extensive margin (inducing businesses
to choose state law) could undercut the intended effect along the inten-
sive margin (improving payoffs to junior creditors).
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are a case in point
(Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 [2005]). As Haines and Hendel (2005) explain,
these reforms raised the costs of small business bankruptcy by imposing
heavier reporting requirements,32 time constraints,33 and other burdens34
on distressed small businesses. The goal of the reforms was, it seems,
to offer greater protection to junior creditors. The effect may be just the
opposite in many cases. By raising the cost of federal law, the reforms
seem to have increased the attractiveness of state procedures, which
typically offer less protection for junior creditors.
Federal preemption rules push in the opposite direction. Federal law
generally preempts conflicting state law dealing with the same subject
32. These include requiring periodic reports on profitability and projected cash flow,
comparisons of actual and projected receipts and disbursements, and a statement indicating
whether the debtor is in compliance with bankruptcy and tax laws (11 U.S.C. sec. 308),
obligating the debtor or trustee to submit a balance sheet and other financial reports within
7 days of filing a Chapter 11 petition (11 U.S.C. sec. 1116), and authorizing the U.S.
Trustee to visit the business premise of the debtor and inspect records (28 U.S.C. sec.
586[a][7]).
33. A reorganization plan must be submitted within 300 days (11 U.S.C. sec.
1121[e][2]), and the plan must be confirmed within 45 days after submission (sec. 1129[e]).
34. For example, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(n) eliminates the automatic stay in cases involving
small businesses that exited a prior bankruptcy case, via dismissal or a confirmed reor-
ganization plan, within 2 years of the current bankruptcy case.
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matter. In deciding whether conflict exists, courts assess whether the law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress” (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 [1941]). In making this assessment, the Ninth Circuit recently
held that state law regulating California’s ABC procedure is in conflict
with the Federal Bankruptcy Code (Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos,
Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 [9th Cir. 2005]). California law, like the code, per-
mits the assignee to bring suit against creditors, including insiders, who
received preferential payment during the firm’s descent into insolvency
(Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. sec. 1800[b]). A preferential payment is one that
allows the creditor to receive a greater payoff than other creditors with
similar priority. Under California law, the assignee can sue any insider
who received preferential payments within 1 year of the ABC; other
creditors can be sued if they were paid within 90 days of the assignment.
This law was, at the time of the case, identical to the Bankruptcy Code’s
rules regulating preferential payments (11 U.S.C. sec. 547).35 The Ninth
Circuit held that the state law is preempted because it conflicts with one
of the code’s basic goals—“equitably distributing a debtor’s assets
among competing creditors” (Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d 1203). Under
the code, a debtor or trustee may recover preferential payments, subject
to federal court oversight. The same oversight does not exist under state
law.
Assuming its decision is followed in California state courts (thus far,
it has not),36 the Ninth Circuit has eliminated an important protection
for senior creditors—the power to attack insider self-dealing. Preemption
doctrine is reducing the attractiveness of state law at the same time that
Congress is increasing it.
Coherent bankruptcy policy must account for the interaction between
state and federal law. It is unclear whether the current state-federal
balance is optimal. State law offers a menu of alternatives for distressed
small businesses—foreclosures, bulk sales, ABCs, compositions, receiv-
erships, and other procedures. Businesses can sort themselves across
these options, choosing the procedures that maximize the return to cred-
itors and insiders. In this context, federal bankruptcy law serves only
35. The case is discussed in greater detail by Kurth and Cohen (2006).
36. Since that decision, two California courts of appeals have reached the opposite
conclusion, thereby creating a split between state and federal appellate courts (Credit
Managers Ass’n v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 590 [Cal. Ct. App.
2006]; Haberbush v. Charles and Dorothy Cummins Family Ltd. Partnership, 139 Cal.
App. 4th 1630 [Cal. Ct. App. 2006]).
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one function: a law of last resort when bargaining between debtors and
senior creditors fails. There is no obvious reason why federal law is
needed or well suited to perform this function. Indeed, if state laws
offered a richer set of alternatives, including one that offered a strong
mechanism for auditing the affairs of distressed businesses, there would
be little use for federal law. And it is possible that a state mechanism
would be superior to federal law. It would be the product of local po-
litical pressure, not lobbying at the national level, and so might be more
sensitive to the conditions of local businesses. Federal law has long been
criticized as being overly cumbersome and expensive for small businesses
(see, for example, Haines and Hendel 2005, pp. 73–74; National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission 1997, p. 614). Largely the same procedures
are used in cases involving small businesses as in those involving mul-
tinational corporations. Perhaps, then, policy makers should consider
relaxing federal preemption doctrine in this area. Freed from the doc-
trine’s constraints, states could better regulate their insolvency proce-
dures and develop stronger mechanisms for auditing distressed busi-
nesses.
7. CONCLUSION
Current discussions of small business distress focus on federal bank-
ruptcy law. These discussions should focus on state law, which is used
by around 80 percent of failing businesses. The remaining 20 percent
tends to include businesses that are highly distressed, encumbered by
secured debts owed to multiple lenders, and unable to obtain creditor
consent to use state procedures. Creditors withhold consent because the
debtors have mismanaged their relationships with the creditors and be-
cause state procedures offer little protection against insider misbehavior.
Federal bankruptcy filings, in other words, reflect bargaining failure:
they occur only when debtors and senior lenders cannot reach agreement.
The remaining, unanswered question is why federal law is needed to
serve this function. State law could easily provide a procedure that the
parties would use only as a last resort. Federal law appears to serve this
function only because states have been discouraged—by preemption doc-
trine—from doing so. If states were given freedom to regulate more
actively in this area, federal bankruptcy law would become largely ir-
relevant for small businesses.
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APPENDIX: BANKRUPTCY AUDITS VERSUS STATE LAW AUDITS—A SIMPLE
MODEL
Reconsider the model in the main text. Assume that the distressed business has
one senior lender and n unsecured creditors. Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde
(1986) consider a similar environment in which the IRS must decide whether to
audit taxpayers. Adapting their model to the present context, assume that the
value of the firm’s assets is private information. The senior lender can estimate
only the value of the firm’s assets, which are high ( ) with probability q andah
low ( ) with probability . Assume that the bank’s claim exceeds both asseta 1 ql
values: .s 1 a 1 ah l
Because the bank is uncertain about asset value, the manager can potentially
keep some of that value for herself. The bank can prevent this by obtaining
additional information about the value of the assets, but this requires an audit.
Assume first that audits are possible only in federal bankruptcy court and that
these audits are costly. They will generate cost to the bank and to the firm.t t2 1
At the conclusion of the audit, the bank has full information about asset value.
Consider the decision whether to audit. Assume that the difference in po-
tential asset value, , exceeds the transaction costs of an audit,Dp a  a t h l 1
. The bank will, therefore, find it profitable to audit if it is certain that thet2
assets are worth but the manager is only reporting .a ah l
Let denote the asset value reported by the owner-manager. If asset valuer(a)
is low, the owner has no incentive to report dishonestly; she gains nothing from
reporting a higher asset value. Therefore, . If asset value is high, ther(a )p al l
owner may submit a false report, , in order to keep for herself some ofr(a ) ! ah h
the difference in asset value, . If, however, the owner submits a false reporta  ah l
and the bank subsequently discovers this in bankruptcy, the owner suffers a
penalty equal to b. In other words, a dishonest manager forfeits any gains from
the bankruptcy process.
Let a denote the probability that the owner of a business with high asset
value falsely reports low asset value. Applying Bayes’s rule, the bank can compute
the probability that, given a report of low asset value, the business actually has
high asset value:
m(a)p qa/(qa 1 q). (A1)
Knowing this probability, the bank must decide whether to believe an owner-
manager’s report or to force the business into federal bankruptcy court. The
bank will always believe a manager who reports high asset value. Thus, the
problem for the bank is to choose a probability b of forcing a business into
bankruptcy when the owner reports low asset value. This problem is equivalent
to choosing b to maximize the bank’s expected payoff:
b[mah (1 m)(al b) t] (1 b)(al b dt), (A2)
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where d is the owner’s share of transaction costs avoided by using state pro-
cedures (d will reflect the parties’ relative bargaining power). This simplifies to
al b b[m(D b) t] (1 b)dt.
Given the bank’s audit strategy b, the owner-manager will choose a proba-
bility a of reporting false information about asset value. Assuming risk neutrality,
the owner’s problem is to choose a to maximize
a[b(0) (1 b)(D dt b)] (1 a)[bb (1 b)(b dt)], (A3)
which simplifies to
b a[(1 b)D b] (1 b)dt.
The bank will choose b conditional on the owner’s choice a; the owner will
choose a conditional on the bank’s choice b. A Nash equilibrium consists of
owner and bank strategies such that neither party prefers a different strategy,
conditional on the other party’s strategy.
Consider, first, the bank’s optimal strategy. Its marginal benefit from increas-
ing the probability of forcing a business into bankruptcy is
m(D b) (1 d)t. (A4)
The marginal benefit of a bankruptcy filing is independent of b, the probability
of forcing a business into bankruptcy. This means that the bank will choose
federal bankruptcy law whenever equation (A3) is positive and choose state law
whenever it is negative. Thus we can define m′ as the threshold probability such
that equation (A3) is equal to zero:
′m p (1 d)t/(D b).
If m exceeds m′, the bank will force a business into bankruptcy; otherwise, it will
accept the owner-manager’s report. Recall that ). We canm(a)p qa/(qa 1 q
therefore simplify further and identify the threshold probability of misreporting
by owner-managers, a′:
′a p [q/(1 q)][(1 d)t/(D b (1 d)t)]. (A5)
Because m(a) is increasing in a, the bank will force a business into bankruptcy
(that is, set equal to one) if and permit a state law procedure (set′b a 1 a b
equal to zero) if . If , the bank will set b equal to any value between′ ′a ! a ap a
zero and one. Note that a′ is decreasing in d and is equal to zero when d is equal
to one. Thus, unless the bank pays the owner-manager all of the transaction
costs saved by state procedures, there will be a positive probability of false
reports and a positive probability that the bank will audit the firm in bankruptcy.
Note also that a′ could exceed one if t is sufficiently large. If this occurs, the
bank never forces businesses into bankruptcy.
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Now turn to the owner-manager’s optimal strategy. Her marginal benefit
from increasing a is
(1 b)(D b) b. (A6)
This is independent of probability a, which implies that the owner-manager will
report assets honestly (that is, set equal to zero) if equation (A6) is negativea
and will falsify information (set equal to one) if it is positive. Solving for thea
threshold level b′ that sets equation (A6) to zero, we obtain
′b p D/(D b). (A7)
The owner-manager will set equal to one if and set equal to zero if′a b ! b a
. If , she will set a to any value between zero and one.′ ′b 1 b bp b
Multiple equilibria are possible here. If t is very large, so that , the′a p 1
equilibrium will consist of the owner-manager always falsifying information
( ) and the bank never forcing the business into bankruptcy ( ). If✻ ✻a p 1 b p 0
t is sufficiently low that , the bank will force a business into bankruptcy′a ! 1
only if . Thus, another equilibrium consists of owner-managers falsifying′ap a
information with probability and banks choosing federal bankruptcy✻ ′a p a
with probability . This is an equilibrium, then, in which some distressed✻ ′b p b
businesses will use state procedures, while others (with probability b✻) will use
federal bankruptcy law.
This assumes that an audit is possible only in federal court. The foregoing
analysis changes little when this assumption is relaxed. Suppose audits can be
pursued under state law but that these audits generate noisy signals about asset
value. The signal can be either high ( ) or low ( ). If the state audit yields av vh l
high signal, the probability that business assets have high value rises to .q 1 qh
If the signal is low, the probability of high-value assets falls to . The bankq ! ql
now faces two decisions: (1) whether to audit first under state or federal law
and (2) if it audits first under state law and receives signal v, whether to audit
again under federal law in order to obtain certain information about asset value.
Assume the bank audits first under state law. Will it ever audit again under
federal law? Because the signal generated by a state law audit varies only the
bank’s beliefs regarding q, the analysis summarized in equations (A1)–(A7) is
equally applicable to this question. For each signal , with its corre-v {v , v }h l
sponding probability , there exists an equilibrium in which the bankq  {q , q }i h l
audits again in federal court with probability .b  {b , b }i h l
This equilibrium exists, of course, because state audits are inferior to federal
audits. State procedures do vary in the power they give creditors to audit busi-
nesses. In some states, businesses are required to submit financial statements to
local courts; an owner-manager who falsifies this information will face civil or
criminal sanctions. In addition, in some states creditors (or assignees) have the
power to attack insider self-dealing or to sue creditors who received preferential
treatment. When a state offers these kinds of regulations, it increases the ability
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of senior lenders to resolve uncertainty surrounding asset value. If state regu-
lations enable lenders to discover the true value of business assets, there will be
no equilibrium in which lenders audit again under federal law. And if state audits
are cheaper than federal bankruptcy filings, all audits will occur under state law.
There will be no need for federal bankruptcy filings.
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